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Abstract
In a very interesting paper, Liberatore and Schaerf showed how to express the leading proposals
of belief revision using a circumscription. In order to deal with one of the belief revision theories,
they had to introduce a new circumscription, based on the cardinality instead of the classical set
inclusion. We give a few properties of this new circumscription. In doing so, we prove that in
the finite case, there is inter-definability between ordinary circumscription and cardinality-based
circumscription. We show why a technical result published in the initial paper cannot be true, and
we give a related result which is true instead, where the respective roles of the varying or fixed
propositions are reversed. This result could help automatic computation. We use the logical properties
of circumscriptions and cardinality-based circumscriptions in order to highlight the behavior of
cardinality-based circumscription and the importance of the fixed propositions. This study allows
a full description of the expressive power of cardinality-based circumscription in the finite case, and
it provides some limitations in the infinite case. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Circumscription; Common sense reasoning; Knowledge representation; Nonmonotonic reasoning;
Preferential entailment; Belief revision
1. Introduction
This note gives significative properties of a new circumscription, based on cardinal-
ity, introduced in [9] in order to simulate a formalism of belief revision. Circumscription
is a natural way, using a classical logic, associated with the notion of “exceptions”: cir-
cumscribing the exceptions means defining as few exceptions as possible. In circumscrip-
tion, “as few as” is defined in terms of set inclusion. In cardinality-based circumscription,
“as few as” is defined more literally, by counting the exceptions. There are situations in
which cardinality-based circumscription is more appropriate. Beside some belief revision
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problems, we can add diagnosis, where we may want to minimize the number of faulty
components: Liberatore and Schaerf [9] also refer to this application, and Sharma and
Colomb [18] have independently introduced a cardinality-based circumscription for this
purpose.
Section 3 shows that, when a finite number of propositions are circumscribed,
cardinality-based circumscription and ordinary circumscription have the same expressive
power, by providing a simple translation from each formalism to the other. Section 4
studies cardinality-based circumscription, replacing a technical erroneous result from [9]
by a related result, which could help automatic computation. Section 5 outlines the
study of the logical properties of cardinality-based circumscription, compared to classical
circumscriptions, which allows to give some limitation results in terms of expressivity,
both in the finite and infinite cases. This study clarifies the role of the fixed propositions in
cardinality-based circumscription, and it provides a natural description of the “expressive
power” of finite (cardinality-based) circumscription.
Comment 1. The results relating to cardinality-based circumscription are proved (except
in two “comments”), while the known results relating to preferential entailments and
ordinary circumscriptions are just listed, with a few indications about references, each
result being generally a mix of various original results. These results, coming from, e.g.
[1,6,7,11,17,19], belong more or less to the folklore now. The interested reader can see
[14] for proofs and precise references.
2. Circumscriptions: Ordinary and cardinality-based
Finite cardinality-based (propositional) circumscription is introduced in [8,9,18]. We
will also consider the infinite case, pointing out the situations where a restriction to the
finite case is necessary.
Notations 1. The (propositional) logic considered is denoted by L, V (L) denoting the
set of all propositional symbols P,Q,Z, . . . . As usual, L also denotes the set of all
formulas existing in this logic. Letters ϕ and ψ will denote formulas in L, > and ⊥ being
logical constants for true and false respectively. We will often consider the quotient of
the notion of formula by logical equivalence, writing, e.g., ⊥= P ∧¬P =Q ∧¬Q. The
letter T (with possible subscript) will denote a subset of L. We define the theory of T as
Th(T )= {ϕ/T |= ϕ} and we denote by T the set {Th(T )/T ⊆L} of all the theories in L.
Letters µ and ν denote interpretations of L and Th(µ)= {ϕ/ϕ ∈L,µ |= ϕ} denotes the
theory of µ. For any set of interpretations M1, we use the notation Th(M1) = {ϕ | ϕ ∈
L, µ |= ϕ for any µ ∈M1} =⋂µ∈M1 Th(µ). This ambiguous use of Th and of |= (applied
to sets of formulas or interpretations) is usual in logic and should not provoke confusion.
If S is a set, P(S) denotes the set of all its subsets. We identify each interpretation
to the subset of V (L) that it satisfies: e.g., if V (L) = {P,Q,Z} and µ = {P,Z}, then
Th(µ)= Th(P ∧¬Q∧Z). Thus, M = P(V (L)) is the set of all the interpretations of L.
M(T )= {µ ∈M | µ |= T } denotes the set of all the models of T .
V (T ) denotes the set of the propositional symbols appearing in the formulas of T . If
P ⊆ V (L), we write P (T ) for the set P ∩ V (T ).
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If p = {ϕi}i∈I and p′ = {ϕ′i}i∈I are two sets of formulas in L, indexed by a finite set I ,
we write p⇒ p′ for the conjunction∧i∈I (ϕi⇒ ϕ′i ).
Definitions 1.
(1) A pre-circumscription f (in L) is an extensive (i.e., f (T )⊇ T for any T ) mapping
from T to T . For any subset T of L not in T , we use the abbreviation f (T ) =
f (Th(T )).
(2) (Kraus et al. [6]) Let S be some set, and l be a mapping from S to M . A klm-
preference relation ≺ is a binary relation over S. M≺(T ) denotes the set of the
models µ of T such that there exists s ∈ l−1(µ) which is minimal in l−1(M(T )) for
≺, i.e., such that there exist no s′ ∈ S with l(s′) ∈M(T ) and s′ ≺ s.
The klm-preferential entailment f≺ is the pre-circumscription defined by f≺(T )=
Th(M≺(T )) for any T ⊆L.
(3) ([19]) If, in (2) above, S =M and l = identity, then ≺ is a preference relation and
f≺ is a preferential entailment.
Definition 2 (Liberatore and Schaerf [9, Definitions 3, 4]). V (L)= P ∪Z ∪Q (disjoint
sets). P is the set of the circumscribed propositional symbols, Z is the set of the varying
ones, the remaining ones in Q being fixed. We define the preference relation ≺(P ,Q,Z) by
µ≺(P ,Q,Z) ν if P ∩µ⊂ P ∩ ν and Q∩µ=Q∩ ν (strict ⊂, no condition for Z).
The circumscription CIRC(P ,Q,Z) is the preferential entailment f≺(P ,Q,Z) .
This is the classical (semantic) definition of propositional circumscription.
Proposition 3. P ,Q,Z are as above, T is finite. F(I) denotes the set of all the indexed
sets {ϕi}i∈I , where each ϕi is either⊥ or> and I is any given set. If p = {ϕP | P ∈ P (T )}
and z= {ϕZ | Z ∈ Z(T )} are sets of formulas, φ[p] denotes the formula (p⇒ P (T ))⇒
(P (T )⇒ p), and T [p,Q,z] denotes T in which each P ∈ P and Z ∈ Z is replaced
respectively by ϕP and ϕZ (Q unchanged). T [p,Q,z] is equivalent to a formula, thus the
abusive notation T [p,Q,z] ⇒ φ[p].
We have: CIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T )= Th(T ∪CIRCAX(P ,Q,Z)(T )), where
CIRCAX(P ,Q,Z)(T )= {T [p,Q,z] ⇒ φ[p] | p ∈F(P (T )), z ∈F(Z(T ))}
∪ {¬P | P ∈ P −P (T )}.
The formulas in CIRCAX(P ,Q,Z)(T ) are the circumscription axioms, well known
since [12,16], with three adaptations to the propositional case:
(1) We can focus on the replacing formulas (formulas in p and z) which are > or ⊥.
(2) Higher order quantifiers are not required.
(3) As we want to allow infinite sets P , we must split P into the finite part P (T ) and
its complementary P − P (T ) (otherwise the formula φ[p] would not exist). If P
is finite, the set CIRCAX(P ,Q,Z)(T ) is finite and is thus equivalent to a single
formula.
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Definition 4 (Liberatore and Schaerf [9, Definitions 5, 6], already in [8], cf. also [18,
Definition 4.4]). P ,Q,Z being as above, we define the preference relation <(P ,Q,Z) by
µ<(P ,Q,Z) ν if card(P ∩µ) < card(P ∩ ν) and Q∩µ=Q∩ ν.
The cardinality-based circumscription NCIRC(P ,Q,Z) is the preferential entailment
f<(P ,Q,Z) .
A few immediate consequences of these definitions can now be given:
Proposition 5.
(1) CIRC(P ,Q,Z)= NCIRC(P ,Q,Z) iff card(P )6 2.
(2) We can intersect the sets P ,Q,Z with V (T ): for any ϕ ∈L we have:
(a) CIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ) |= ϕ iff
CIRC(P (T ),Q(T ),Z(T ))(T )∪ {¬P | P ∈ P −P (T )} |= ϕ;
(b) if P (T ) is finite, then NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ) |= ϕ iff
NCIRC(P (T ),Q(T ),Z(T ))(T ) ∪ {¬P | P ∈ P −P (T )} |= ϕ.
(3) (a) If P (T ) is finite, then NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ) |= CIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ).
(b) If P is infinite, then NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ) 6|= CIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ) for some T .
Proof. (1) If card(P )6 2, P 1 ⊆ P and P 2 ⊆ P , then P 1 ⊂ P 2 iff card(P 1) < card(P 2).
If card(P )> 3, we choose P1,P2 and P3 distinct in P and T = {P1∨ (P2∧P3)}, resulting
in P1 /∈ CIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ) and P1 ∈ NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ).
(2) The requirement for messy notations is the only difficulty of the complete proof.
Let us give only the main points. We denote V (L) = P ∪ Q ∪ Z, V (L′) = P (T ) ∪
Q(T )∪Z(T ), ≺=≺(P ,Q,Z) and ≺′=≺(P (T ),Q(T ),Z(T )). Thus CIRC(P ,Q,Z)= f≺ and
CIRC(P (T ),Q(T ),Z(T ))= f≺′ are preferential entailments in L and L′ respectively.
(a) Ifµ ∈M≺(T ) thenµ |= ¬P for any P ∈ P −P (T ): otherwise, ν = µ−(P−P (T ))
would be in M(T ) with ν ≺ µ. Also, if µ ∈ M≺(T ) then µ ∩ V (L′) ∈ M≺′(T ).
Conversely, if µ ∩ V (L′) ∈ M≺′(T ) and µ |= ¬P for any P ∈ P − P (T ), we get
µ ∈M≺(T ). The result for CIRC follows.
(b) We use similar arguments, but we need a finite set P (T ) to avoid having P ∈
P −P (T ) and NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ) 6|= ¬P , as in the next example:
Let us define P = {Pi}i∈N = V (L), <′=<(P ,∅,∅), T = {P2i}i∈N (set of formulas) and
µ = V (T ) = P (T ) = {P2i}i∈N (set of propositional symbols). Then ν ∈M(T ) iff µ ⊆
ν ⊆ V (L). All the elements of M(T ) have the same cardinality, thus M(T ) =M<′(T ).
Thus NCIRC(P ,∅,∅)(T )= Th(T ) 6|= ¬P1.
(3a) If P 1 ⊂ P 2 and P 2 is finite, then card(P 1) < card(P 2) (cf. [18, Theorem 4.1]).
(3b) Let us define µ1 = P = {Pi}i∈N, µ2 = {P2i}i∈N, T = Th({µ1,µ2}), ≺=≺(P ,∅,∅)
and <′=<(P ,∅,∅). We get µ2 ⊂ µ1, i.e., µ2 ≺ µ1, and also card(µ2) 6< card(µ1),
i.e., µ2 6<′ µ1, thus M≺(T ) = {µ2} ⊂ M<′(T ) = M(T ) = {µ1,µ2}: we get ¬P1 /∈
NCIRC(P ,∅,∅)(T )= T and ¬P1 ∈ CIRC(P ,∅,∅)(T )= Th(µ2). 2
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3. Inter-definability of these two circumscriptions when P is finite
Definition 6. Φ is a set of formulas in L, V (L)=Q∪Z, P ′ = {P ′ϕ}ϕ∈Φ is a set of distinct
propositional symbols not in L. The formula circumscription of the formulas Φ , with Q
fixed and Z varying, is defined as follows, for any T ⊆L:
CIRCF(Φ,Q,Z)(T )= CIRC(P ′,Q,Z)(T ∪ {ϕ⇔ P ′ϕ}ϕ∈Φ)∩L.
This is a classic notion (see [3,13,16]) and any ordinary circumscription is a formula
circumscription: CIRC(P ,Q,Z)= CIRCF(P ,Q,Z ∪P ).
We show now that if P is finite, any cardinality-based circumscription is equal to a
formula circumscription: we choose a set of formulas which “counts the elements of P ”.
Notice that the formula circumscription obtained is particular, and could also be called a
“cardinality-based formula circumscription”.
Theorem 7. Let V (L) be P ∪Q∪ Z with card(P )= p finite, T be any subset of L and
ϕi be the formula
ϕi =
∨
S⊆P , card(S)=i
∧
P∈S
P
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
(1) Let P ′ = {P ′i }i∈{1,...,p} be a set of new propositional symbols, we have:
NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T )= CIRC(P ′,Q,Z ∪P )(T ∪ {ϕi⇔ P ′i }i∈{1,...,p})∩L.
(2) NCIRC(P ,Q, Z)(T )= CIRCF({ϕi}i∈{1,...,p},Q,Z ∪P )(T ).
Proof. (1) If µ ∈M , then µ |= ϕi iff card(µ ∩ P ) > i . With e′(µ) = µ ∪ {P ′i | µ |= ϕi}
and T ⊆L we get µ |= T iff e′(µ) |= T ∪ {ϕi⇔ P ′i }i∈{1,...,p}. For any µ,ν in M , we get
µ <(P ,Q,Z) ν iff e′(µ) <(P ′,Q,Z∪P ) e′(ν), and also card(e′(µ) ∩ P ′) < card(e′(ν) ∩ P ′)
iff e′(µ)∩P ′ ⊂ e′(ν)∩P ′. Thus we get µ<(P ,Q,Z) ν iff e′(µ)≺(P ′,Q,Z∪P ) e′(ν) thus:
NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T )=NCIRC(P ′,Q,Z ∪P )(T ∪ {ϕi⇔ P ′i }i∈{1,...,p})
=CIRC(P ′,Q,Z ∪P )(T ∪ {ϕi⇔ P ′i }i∈{1,...,p}).
(2) Use point (1) together with Definition 6.
As an example, if P = {P1,P2,P3}, we get Φ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3} with ϕ1 = P1 ∨ P2 ∨ P3,
ϕ2 = (P1 ∧ P2)∨ (P1 ∧ P3)∨ (P2 ∧ P3), ϕ3 = P1 ∧ P2 ∧ P3. 2
Thus, if we have a method for computing a finite CIRC, such as LWB [5], we can also
compute finite cardinality-based circumscription (but not efficiently, the size of the set of
formulas to be added to T being exponential in card(P )).
For the opposite translation, a generalization of formula circumscription, introduced in
[3, Theorem 15], is adapted to cardinality-based circumscription:
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Theorem 8. If P = {P1, . . . ,Pn} is finite, and if V (L) = P ∪ Q ∪ Z (disjoint sets),
there exists a set P ′ = {P ′1, . . . ,P ′n} of new propositional symbols and a set of formulasT ′ = {Pi⇒¬P ′i }i∈{1,...,n} such that, for any T ⊆L, we have:
CIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T )= NCIRC(P ,Q∪P ′,Z)(T ∪ T ′)∩L.
Proof. We define L′ by V (L′) = V (L) ∪ P ′. Thanks to T ′, we reverse for P ′ in M ′ =
P(V (L′)) the relation ⊆ with respect to P in M . The “smaller cardinal” relation, with
respect to P , relaxes the “strict inclusion” relation, still with respect to P . By fixing P ′,
we “cut the links in excess” in the former relation.
Here comes the formal proof. Let us denote ≺=≺(P ,Q,Z) and <′=<(P ,Q∪P ′,Z). T is
any subset of L. We define the pre-circumscription f in L by
f (T )= f<′ (T ∪ T ′)∩L= NCIRC(P ,Q∪P ′,Z)(T ∪ T ′)∩L.
For any µ ∈M , we define e′(µ)= {P ′i | Pi /∈ µ}, thus we have µ∪e′(µ) ∈M(Th(µ)∪T ′)
and, for any ν ∈M : µ≺ ν iff µ∩P ⊂ ν ∩P and µ∩Q= ν ∩Q.
Let us suppose ν ∈M≺(T ) and ν′ = ν ∪ e′(ν). Then ν′ ∈M(T ∪ T ′). Let us suppose
that there exists µ′ ∈M(T ∪ T ′) such that µ′ <′ ν′. We define µ = µ′ ∩ V (L). Then
µ ∈M(T ), card(µ ∩ P ) = card(µ′ ∩ P ) < card(ν′ ∩ P )= card(ν ∩ P ), µ ∩Q = µ′ ∩
Q= ν′ ∩Q= ν ∩Q, and µ′ ∩P ′ = ν′ ∩P ′ = e′(ν). As µ′ ∈M(T ′) and µ′ ∈M(Th(µ)),
we get µ′ ∩P ′ ⊆ e′(µ). Thus we get e′(ν)⊆ e′(µ), which is equivalent to µ∩P ⊆ ν ∩P .
As we have card(µ ∩ P ) < card(ν ∩ P ), we get µ ∩ P ⊂ ν ∩ P . Since we also have
µ∩Q= ν ∩Q, we get µ≺ ν, which contradicts ν ∈M≺(T ) and µ ∈M(T ). Thus, such
µ′ cannot exist and we have ν′ ∈M<′(T ∪ T ′) with ν = ν′ ∩ V (L).
Let us suppose ν′ ∈M<′(T ∪T ′) and ν = ν′ ∩V (L). We get ν ∈M(T ). Let us suppose
that there exists µ ∈M(T ) such that µ ≺ ν. Let us define µ′ = µ ∪ (ν′ ∩ P ′). As µ ≺ ν,
we have µ′ ∩P = µ∩P ⊂ ν ∩P = ν′ ∩P , and µ′ ∩Q= µ∩Q= ν ∩Q= ν′ ∩Q. As
we have µ′ ∩P ′ = ν′ ∩P ′, and as µ′ ∩P ⊂ ν′ ∩P implies card(µ′ ∩P ) < card(ν′ ∩P )
from the finiteness of P , we get µ′ <′ ν′. For any Pi ∈ P , if Pi ∈ µ, we have Pi ∈ ν, thus
Pi ∈ ν′ thus, as ν′ ∈M(T ′), P ′i /∈ ν′, thus P ′i /∈ µ′: this shows that we have µ′ ∈M(T ′),
thus µ′ ∈M(T ∪ T ′), which contradicts ν′ ∈M<′(T ∪ T ′): Such µ cannot exist, and we
get ν ∈M≺(T ).
We have established: M≺(T ) = {µ′ ∩ V (L) | µ′ ∈ M<′(T ∪ T ′)}. Then, it is
straightforward to conclude: f (T )= f≺(T )= CIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ). 2
The translation in Theorem 8 is easier than the opposite translation, given in Theo-
rem 7(1): the size card(P ′) = card(P ) of the additional vocabulary P ′ is the same, but
here the size of the fixed set of formulas T ′ is linear in card(P ).
4. More about cardinality-based circumscription
Even if the two circumscriptions are inter-definable when P is finite, it makes sense to
study cardinality-based circumscription because its behavior is sometimes very different
from the behavior of classical circumscriptions.
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Theorem 9 (de Kleer and Konolige [4]). Q = {Qj }j∈J and we define a set of new
(meaning not in L and all distinct) propositional symbols Q′ = {Q′j }j∈J . For any T ⊆L
we get:
CIRC(P ∪Q∪Q′, ∅, Z)(T ∪ {Qj ⇔¬Q′j }j∈J )∩L= CIRC(P , Q, Z)(T ).
This result is interesting because the situation is different from cardinality-based
circumscription, where, as already seen in Theorem 8, the fixed propositions play a crucial
role. Let us describe the situation in which results are similar to Theorem 9 for cardinality-
based circumscription.
Theorem 10. Let Z = {Zk}k∈K and Zr be disjoint subsets of V (L). We define a set of new
symbols Z′ = {Z′k}k∈K . If Z is finite, we get, for any T ⊆L:
(1) NCIRC(P ∪ Z ∪ Z′,Q,Zr )(T ∪ {Zk ⇔ ¬Z′k}k∈K) ∩ L = NCIRC(P ,Q,Z ∪
Zr )(T ). Thus
(2) NCIRC(P ∪Z ∪Z′,Q,∅)(T ∪ {Zk⇔¬Z′k}k∈K) ∩L= NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ).
Proof. We consider the case Zr = ∅ (point (2)), which simplifies the notations and is easy
to extend to any Zr (point (1)). Thus, V (L)= P ∪Q∪Z.
To any µ ∈M =P(V (L)) we associate e′(µ)= µ∪ {Z′k | k ∈K,Zk /∈µ}. (V0)
If T ⊆L, then M(T ∪ {Zk⇔¬Z′k}k∈K)= {e′(µ) | µ ∈M(T )⊆M}. (V1)
As P ,Z,Z′ are disjoint, we get, for any µ′ ∈M ′ =P(V (L)∪Z′),
card
(
µ′ ∩ (P ∪Z ∪Z′))= card(µ′ ∩P )+ card(µ′ ∩ (Z ∪Z′)). (V2)
If µ′ ∈M({Zk⇔¬Z′k}k∈K), then
card
(
µ′ ∩ (Z ∪Z′))= card(Z)= card(Z′) (V3)
(indeed Zk ∈ µ′ iff Z′k /∈ µ′, this is the key point of this proof ).
As Z is finite, for any µ,ν in M we get, from (V0), (V2) and (V3): µ <(P ,Q,Z) ν iff
e′(µ) <(P∪Z∪Z′,Q,∅) e′(ν). From (V1) we get then, if T ⊆ L and ϕ ∈ L: NCIRC(P ,Q,
Z)(T ) |= ϕ iff NCIRC(P ∪Z ∪Z′,Q,∅)(T ∪ {Zk⇔¬Z′k}k∈K) |= ϕ. 2
We need a finite Z. If Z is infinite and card(P ) 6 card(Z), for any µ′ ∈ M(T ∪
{Zk ⇔ ¬Z′k}k∈K), we have card(µ′ ∩ (P ∪ Z ∪ Z′)) = card(Z), thus µ′ is a model of
NCIRC(P ∪Z ∪Z′,Q,∅)(T ∪ {Zk⇔¬Z′k}k∈K) and we get:
NCIRC(P ∪Z ∪Z′,Q,∅)(T ∪ {Zk⇔¬Z′k}k∈K)= Th(T ∪ {Zk⇔¬Z′k}k∈K).
Comment 2. This obviously does not work for circumscription: if P 6= ∅ and Z 6= ∅, we
cannot have CIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T )= CIRC(P ′,Q′,∅)(T ∪ T ′) ∩L for any T ⊆ L, where
V (L)= P ∪Q∪Z ⊆ P ′ ∪Q′ and T ′ is independent of T . Let us adapt a known method
[10, Proposition 2] (see also [2] for this problem) for suppressing the varying objects in an
ordinary circumscription, to the propositional case:
If V (L′) = P ∪Q is finite and V (L) = V (L′) ∪ Z, we get, for any T ⊆ L: CIRC(P ,
Q,Z)(T )= Th(CIRC(P ,Q,∅)(Th(T )∩L′)∪ T ).
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The same result holds with NCIRC replacing CIRC (P can even be enumerable
here).
These last two results come from [15] (Theorems 8.18 and 8.20), to which we refer the
interested reader. Thus, if V (L) is finite, we get two easy ways for eliminating the varying
propositions in a cardinality-based circumscription.
Theorem 11. If more symbols are circumscribed or allowed to vary, the cardinality-based
circumscription is stronger: If P 1 ∪ P 2 ∪Q ∪ Z1 ∪ Z2 = V (L) (disjoint sets), we get, if
P 2(T ) is finite (in particular if P 2 or T is finite):
NCIRC
(
P 1 ∪P 2,Q,Z1 ∪Z2)(T ) |= NCIRC(P 1,Q∪P 2 ∪Z2,Z1)(T ).
(Remember that, contrary to Theorem 10, this result holds for CIRC in place of NCIRC,
even without a finiteness condition.)
Proof. Let us denote <1=<(P 1∪P 2,Q,Z1∪Z2) and <2=<(P 1,Q∪P 2∪Z2,Z1). Then f<1 =
NCIRC(P 1 ∪P 2,Q,Z1 ∪Z2) and f<2 = NCIRC(P 1,Q∪P 2 ∪Z2,Z1).
(R1) Let µ,ν be in M , with µ ∩ P 2 finite and ν <2 µ. Then card(ν ∩ P 1) <
card(µ∩P 1) and card(µ∩P 2)= card(ν ∩P 2) ∈N, thus card(ν∩ (P 1∪P 2)) <
card(µ∩ (P 1 ∪P 2)) and, since µ∩Q= ν ∩Q, it follows that ν <1 µ.
Let us suppose that µ ∈M<1(T ), ν ∈M(T ) and ν <2 µ. Then, as µ ∈M<1(T ), the
set µ ∩P 2 is included in P 2(T ) and is thus finite. From (R1) we then get a contradiction,
thus we get M<1(T )⊆M<2(T ), and it follows f<1(T ) |= f<2(T ). 2
The converse is obviously false, in general.
Corollary 12.
(1) For any ϕ ∈ L and any T ⊆L, if Q= {Qj }j∈J is finite, if Q′ = {Q′j }j∈J and the
Q′j ’s are not in V (L) and all distinct, we get: if NCIRC(P , Q, Z)(T ) |= ϕ then
NCIRC(P ∪Q∪Q′,∅,Z)(T ∪ {Qj ⇔¬Q′j }j∈J ) |= ϕ.
(2) If Q is not empty and finite (and P 6= ∅), there exist T ⊆L and ϕ ∈L such that
NCIRC(P ∪Q∪Q′,∅,Z)(T ∪ {Qj ⇔¬Q′j }j∈J ) |= ϕ
and NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ) 6|= ϕ.
Proof. (1) We get NCIRC(P ,∅,Z ∪Q)(T ) |= NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ) from Theorem 11,
thus, if NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ) |= ϕ, then NCIRC(P ,∅,Z ∪Q)(T ) |= ϕ. As Q is finite, we
get from Theorem 10(1), for any ϕ ∈L: NCIRC(P ,∅,Q∪Z)(T ) |= ϕ iff
NCIRC(P ∪Q∪Q′,∅,Z)(T ∪ {Qj ⇔¬Q′j }j∈J ) |= ϕ.
Q must be finite here (cf. Theorem 10), otherwise, if card(P )6 card(Q), then:
NCIRC(P ∪Q∪Q′,∅,Z)(T ∪ {Qj ⇔¬Q′j }j∈J )= Th(T ∪ {Qj ⇔¬Q′j }j∈J ).
(2) Use Example 13 below, which can easily be generalized. 2
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Example 13. P = {P },Q= {Q},Z = ∅, T = {Q⇒ P }.
Let us define Q′ = {Q′}, <1=<(P ,Q,Z) and <2=<(P∪Q∪Q′,∅,Z).
ThenM<1(T )= {∅, {P,Q}} (we have ∅ 6<1 {P,Q} and {P } 6<1 {P,Q}) and M<2(T ∪
{Q⇔¬Q′})= {{Q′}} (we have {Q′}<2 {P,Q′} and {Q′}<2 {P,Q}).
Thus we get NCIRC(P ∪Q ∪Q′,∅,Z)(T ∪ {Q⇔¬Q′}) |= ¬P and NCIRC(P ,Q,
Z)(T ) 6|= ¬P .
So, the converse of Corollary 12(1) does not hold, which proves that [9, Corollary 9]
is false. Theorem 10 shows that a result similar to Theorem 9 exists for finite cardinality-
based circumscription, but when the varying and the fixed propositions are exchanged.
The only part of [9, Corollary 9] which remains true (Corollary 12(1)) is an immediate
consequence of this new result. The falsity of [9, Corollary 9] implies the falsity of [9,
Corollary 16], otherwise [9] is unaffected.
Remark 14. We may also define the parallel cardinality-based circumscription
f<
((P i )i∈I ;Q,Z)
, where (
⋃
i∈I P i )∪Q∪Z = V (L) (disjoint union), with µ <((P i )i∈I ;Q,Z) ν
if
(1) ν ∩Q= µ∩Q,
(2) card(ν ∩P i )6 card(µ∩P i ), for any i ∈ I , and
(3) card(ν ∩P i ) < card(µ∩P i ), for some i ∈ I .
With ordinary circumscription, this would be equivalent to the circumscription of
⋃
i∈I P i ,
but with cardinality-based circumscription, such a definition is often necessary. Indeed, it
is frequent when using propositional logic for representing knowledge, that various kinds
of propositions are needed (Bi ’s for birds, Pi ’s for planes, and so on), and it is not always
desirable to count all these elements together.
Theorem 7(1) also applies here: any finite parallel cardinality-based circumscription can
be written as an ordinary circumscription. And this result has a direct converse, even in the
infinite case (see below, after Corollary 29).
5. The contribution of logical properties
Let us recall a few results, useful for our purpose (see Comment 1).
Proposition 15 (Makinson [11]). Any klm-preferential entailment satisfies (CT) and (CR).
Cumulative transitivity: if T ⊆ T ′′ ⊆ f (T ) then f (T ′′)⊆ f (T ). (CT)
Case reasoning: f (T1)∩ f (T2)⊆ f (Th(T1)∩ Th(T2)). (CR)
Definitions 16.
• A klm-preference relation ≺ is safely founded (sf ) if, for any T and any s ∈
l−1(M(T )), there exists s′ ∈ l−1(M(T )) minimal in l−1(M(T )) for ≺ such that
s′ = s or s′ ≺ s (cf. Definition 1(2)).
• ≺ is well founded (wf ) if it is transitive, irreflexive, and there exists no infinitely
decreasing chain (si+1 ≺ si for any i ∈N).
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(CT) is “cut” in [6,11], and (CR) is “OR” in [6] and “distribution” in [11]. (sf ) has got
various names (“with minimally modelable theories” [1], “smooth” [6], “stoppered” [11],
. . .), (wf ) is usual in mathematics.
Proposition 17.
(1) [known] Let ≺ be a preference relation. If ≺ is (sf ), it is transitive and irref lexive
(converse true for V (L) finite).
(2) (Obvious) Let ≺ and ≺′ be two preference relations. If ≺ is irref lexive and if
f≺ = f≺′ , then ≺=≺′.
(3) [11,14] The relation ≺(P ,Q,Z) associated with the ordinary CIRC satisfies (sf ) and
its opposite (P ,Q,Z) also. The same result holds for CIRCF.
(4) [known] The relation ≺(P ,Q,Z) falsifies (wf ) as soon as P is infinite.
Proposition 18. If a klm-preference relation ≺ satisfies (sf ), then f = f≺ satisfies
(CUMU) [6,11], if moreover ≺ is a preference relation, f≺ satisfies also (PC) [1,11].
Cumulativity: if T ⊆ T ′′ ⊆ f (T ) then f (T )= f (T ′′). (CUMU)
Preservation of consistency: if f (T ) |= ⊥ then T |= ⊥. (PC)
Here is what happens for cardinality-based circumscription:
Proposition 19. The preference relation <(P ,Q,Z) associated with NCIRC satisfies (wf ),
thus (sf ), but its opposite relation falsifies (sf ) as soon as P is infinite.
Proof. (wf ) comes from set theory (about cardinals) and (wf ) implies obviously (sf ). The
falsification of (sf ) by the opposite relation is proved by Example 20 below, which can be
generalized to any Q,Z and any infinite P .
Example 20 (Moinard and Rolland [15, Proof of Remark 7.25-3]). V (L) = P =
{Pi}i∈N−{0}, <′=<(P ,∅,∅), the opposite relation being written >′. We define µi =
{Pj }i6j62i ⊆ P (thus µ0 = ∅) and T = Th({µi | i ∈ N}). We get M(T ) = {µi | i ∈ N}.
Thus, M(T ) 6= ∅ and M>′(T )= ∅. 2
Proposition 21.
(1) Any ordinary, formula, or cardinality-based circumscription satisfies (CR), (CT),
(CUMU) and (PC).
(2) (cf. [17] for CIRC) They also satisfy (DC0) (provided Φ is finite for CIRCF).
Disjunctive coherence (formula version):
f (ϕ)∪ f (ψ) |= f (ϕ ∨ψ). (DC0)
(3) If P is infinite, we cannot express, for any T ⊆L, a given ordinary circumscription
in L as the restriction to L of a cardinality-based circumscription defined in a
greater language L′, applied to the union of T and a fixed subset T ′ of L′.
Proof. (1) Proposition 15 gives (CR) and (CT), Propositions 17(3), 18 and 19 give
(CUMU) and (PC) (for CIRCF, see also, e.g., [11]).
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(2) From the equivalence between {ϕ1⇒ ϕ0, ϕ2⇒ ϕ0} and {(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)⇒ ϕ0}, and from
Proposition 3 we get (the “invariant formula” φ[p] in CIRCAX taking the role of ϕ0):
Th(CIRCAX(P ,Q,Z)(ϕ ∨ ψ)) = Th(CIRCAX(P ,Q,Z)(ϕ) ∪ CIRCAX(P ,Q,Z)(ψ)).
The side ⊆ of this equality, together with Th(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⊆ Th(Th(ϕ) ∪ Th(ψ)), give (DC0)
for CIRC. It is important to notice that when applying Proposition 3 here, we must
choose some writing of the formulas such that V (ϕ) = V (ψ) = V (ϕ ∨ ψ): this can be
done by replacing ϕ by ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ ¬ψ) and similarly for ψ . From Definition 6, if Φ is
finite, we can define a set of formula circumscription axioms, having the property given
above for CIRCAX, which gives (DC0) for CIRCF. As P (ϕ) is finite for any formula,
Proposition 5(2b) and Theorem 7(2) give then the result for NCIRC.
(3) Let us define, for any T ⊆ L, f (T ) = NCIRC(P ′,Q′,Z′)(T ∪ T ′) ∩ L where
V (L)= P ∪Q∪Z ⊆ P ′ ∪Q′ ∪Z′ = V (L′), T ′ being a fixed subset ofL′. We suppose that
we have f (T )= CIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ) for any T ⊆ L. Then f is a preferential entailment
f≺ in L where ≺=≺(P ,Q,Z) is an irreflexive preference relation. It can be proved that in
such a case, as<′=<(P ′,Q′,Z′) satisfies (wf ) from Proposition 19,≺must satisfy (wf ). The
complete proof is straightforward, but too long to be included here, so we refer the reader
to [15, Preservation result 6.25] for the details. It relies on the fact that, as ≺ and <′ are
irreflexive, we get: for anyµ,ν inM ,M<′(Th(ν)∪T ′) is not empty, and µ≺ ν iff [for any
ν′ ∈M<′(Th(ν) ∪ T ′), there exists µ′′ ⊆ V (L′)− V (L) such that µ′ = µ ∪ µ′′ ∈M(T ′)
and µ′ <′ ν′]. Thus, if an infinitely decreasing chain exits for ≺, a fortiori such a chain
exists for <′.
We get a contradiction from Propositions 17(2) and 17(4). Thus, we cannot have
CIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T )= NCIRC(P ′,Q′,Z′)(T ∪ T ′)∩L for any T ⊆L. 2
Comment 3. Point (3) above shows why Theorem 8 does not extend to infinite P .
However [15, Theorem 7.24] shows how to extend Theorem 7(1):
If V (L) = P ∪Q ∪ Z with P enumerable, if we define the set of new propositional
symbols P ′ = {P ′i }i∈N−{0}, we have, for any T ⊆L,
NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T )
= CIRC(P ′,Q,P ∪Z)
(
T ∪
{(∧
P∈S
P
)
⇒ P ′card(S)
}
∅⊂S⊆P , S finite
)
∩L.
Let us again examine the role of the fixed propositions in NCIRC.
Definition 22 (Lehmann and Magidor [7]). A preference relation ≺ is ranked (rk), if it is
a strict order and µ3 ≺ µ1 implies µ2 ≺µ1 or µ3 ≺ µ2.
Proposition 23 (Lehmann and Magidor [7]). A strict order relation≺ on a set E is ranked
iff there exists a linear strict order relation < on a set X and a mapping r from E to X
such that x ≺ y iff r(x) < r(y).
Proposition 24 (Lehmann and Magidor [7]). If ≺ is (rk), f≺ satisfies rational monotony
(RatM1): if ¬ψ /∈ f≺(T ) then f≺(T )⊆ f≺(T ∪ {ψ}).
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Proposition 25.
(1) A cardinality-based circumscription without fixed propositions satisfies (RatM1): If
NCIRC(P ,∅,Z)(T ) |= ϕ and NCIRC(P ,∅,Z)(T ) 6|= ¬ψ , then
NCIRC(P ,∅,Z)(T ∪ {ψ}) |= ϕ.
(2) Any nontrivial cardinality-based circumscription with fixed proposition(s) (P 6=
∅, Q 6= ∅), falsifies (RatM1).
Proof. (1) We associate to any interpretation µ its “rank” r(µ)= card(µ ∩ P ). We have
µ<(P ,∅,Z) ν iff r(µ) < r(ν). Use Propositions 23 and 24.
(2) Use Example 13 again, which can here obviously be generalized to any set Z and
any non empty sets P and Q:
Example 13 (continued).P = {P }, Q= {Q},Z = ∅, T = {Q⇒ P }. Choose ψ = P and
ϕ = P ⇔Q.
(1) NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ) 6|= ¬ψ (already seen above in Example 13).
(2) NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ) |= ϕ (from NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T )= Th(ϕ)).
(3) NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ∪ {ψ}) 6|= ϕ (from NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(P )= Th(P )).
This falsification of (RatM1) corresponds to the fact that <(P ,Q,Z) is not (rk):
∅ <(P ,Q,Z) {P } while {P,Q} 6<(P ,Q,Z) {P } and ∅ 6<(P ,Q,Z) {P,Q} (the intersec-
tions with Q differ). The existence of a fixed Q is crucial here. 2
Remark 26. Proposition 25 shows that it is impossible to express easily a NCIRC
involving some fixed proposition (P 6= ∅, Q 6= ∅) as a NCIRC without fixed proposition:
we cannot have NCIRC(P ,Q,Z)(T ) = NCIRC(P ′,∅,Z′)(T ∪ T ′) ∩ L for any T ⊆ L,
where V (L)= P ∪Q∪Z ⊆ P ′ ∪Q′ = V (L′) and T ′ is some fixed subset of L′. Indeed,
(RatM1) is falsified by the left-hand side, while (RatM1) is preserved by the operations
made on the right-hand side. Thus, not only the converse of point (1) in Corollary 12
(i.e., [9, Corollary 9]) is false, but no generalization of this kind can actually exist.
This illustrates the particular role played by the fixed propositions in cardinality-based
circumscriptions.
Let us study more precisely the behavior of cardinality-based circumscription.
Definition 27. A strict order relation ≺ is ranked by blocks (rkb), if
µ3 ≺ µ1 and
 (a) µ≺ µ1 and µ≺ µ2, or
(b) µ3 ≺ µ and µ2 ≺ µ
 imply (µ2 ≺ µ1 or µ3 ≺µ2).
(rk) implies (rkb), and not conversely. Here is the explanation for the name:
Proposition 28. A strict order relation≺ on a setE is ranked by block iff there exists some
partition of E in sets Ei (i ∈ I) such that ≺ is ranked on each Ei and no element of Ei is
in relation to an element of Ej if i 6= j .
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Proof (Sketch). (if) Easy.
(only if) Let ≺ be (rkb). We define S(µ) = {ν ∈ E | µ ≺ ν}, P(µ) = {ν ∈ E | ν ≺ µ}
and the relation ' on E by: µ' ν if
(1) µ≺ ν or
(2) ν ≺ µ or
(3) S(µ)= S(ν) and P(µ)= P(ν).
' is reflexive and symmetrical and transitivity can be proved by examining all the 3×3= 9
possibilities. It is straightforward to show that the set {Ei}i∈I of the equivalence classes of
' in E has the wanted property. 2
Corollary 29. The relation <(P ,Q,Z) associated with any cardinality-based circumscrip-
tion is (rkb).
Proof. Consequence of Propositions 23 and 28: We denote <′=<(P ,Q,Z). Each Q′ ⊆Q
determines a “block” in M which is the set of all the interpretations µ in M such that
µ∩Q=Q′. Thus we get our partition of M , each block is separated from the other ones
for <′ and <′ is (rk) in each block (again define r(µ)= card(µ∩P )). 2
This shows that it is impossible to express an ordinary circumscription of at least three
propositions (indeed, ⊆ falsifies (rkb) when there are at least three elements) directly in
terms of a cardinality-based circumscription, in the same language. Theorem 8 shows
how to overcome this limitation in the finite case, by extending the language, while
Proposition 21(3) gives an even stronger limitation result in the infinite case.
Notice that any ordinary circumscription can easily be expressed as a parallel
cardinality-based circumscription of Remark 14: it suffices to write P =⋃i∈I P i in which
each P i has at most two elements.
Remark 30. Using Theorem 8 and above results, we are able to express any classical
circumscription with a finite set P (thus any classical circumscription of a finitely
axiomatizable theory T ) as a combination of pre-circumscriptions satisfying (RatM1) (i.e.,
of “rational consequence relations” in the meaning of [6,7]). Indeed, from Corollary 29,
the preference relation associated with cardinality-based circumscription is a simple
juxtaposition of preference relations satisfying (rk).
In the finite case, let us give, as in [3, Theorem 15], a last result relating to the
“expressive power of cardinality-based circumscription”. This result shows that classical
circumscription is not the only form to demonstrate this expressive power.
Theorem 31. If V (L) is finite, then a pre-circumscription f in L satisfies (CR) and
(CUMU) iff it can be expressed as follows using an ordinary circumscription (respectively
a cardinality-based circumscription):
There exist a language L′ containing L, three disjoint finite sets P ′,Q′,Z′ such that
P ′ ∪Q′ ∪ Z′ = V (L′), and a set T ′ ⊆ L′ such that, for any T ⊆ L, we have f (T ) =
CIRC(P ′,Q′,Z′)(T ∪ T ′)∩L, respectively f (T )= NCIRC(P ′,Q′,Z′)(T ∪ T ′)∩L.
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Proof. There are two results, one with CIRC, one with NCIRC.
Result with CIRC. (only if) We know from [6] that a finite pre-circumscription
satisfies (CR) and (CUMU) iff it is a finite klm-preferential entailment associated with
an irreflexive and transitive (i.e., a strict order) klm-preference relation ≺. We know from
[3, Theorem 15] that if f is a finite klm-preferential entailment f≺ where≺ is a strict order,
there exists a finite language L′ with V (L) = P ∪Q ∪ Z ⊆ P ′ ∪Q′ ∪ Z′ = V (L′) and
a set T ′ ⊆L′ such that, for any T ⊆L, we have f (T )= CIRC(P ′,Q′,Z′)(T ∪ T ′) ∩L
(Costello [3] gives the result for CIRCF, but from Definition 6, we get the result for CIRC).
(if) If f ′ is a pre-circumscription ofL′ satisfying (CR) (respectively (CUMU)), if T ′ is a
fixed subset ofL′ and if f is the pre-circumscription in L defined by f (T )= f ′(T ∪T ′)∩
L, then f satisfies (CR) (respectively (CUMU)). Here f ′ = CIRC(P ′,Q′,Z′) satisfies
(CR) and (CUMU) from Proposition 21(1).
Result with NCIRC. Theorem 8 gives the “only if” part for NCIRC, from the CIRC
result, while the “if” part is as in the case of CIRC. 2
6. Conclusion
We have given some properties of cardinality-based circumscription as defined in [9].
We have shown that in the finite case (the only case really considered in [9]), cardinality-
based circumscriptions can be expressed easily in terms of ordinary circumscriptions,
and conversely. However, this does not mean that it is useless to study the properties of
cardinality-based circumscription. For instance, our study shows that a technical result
of [9] is false: a true equivalence for ordinary circumscriptions has been translated word
for word for cardinality-based circumscriptions, and we have shown that some adaptation
is necessary. We have given this adaptation (exchanging the roles of the varying and
the fixed propositions) and shown that the only part of the erroneous equivalence which
remains true is a consequence of this new result. In doing so, we have given a few positive
and negative results involving modifications of the lists of the circumscribed, varying or
fixed propositions, results which could help the automatic computation of cardinality-based
circumscription.
We have outlined a comparative study of the logical properties of ordinary circumscrip-
tion and of cardinality-based circumscription. This study helps to get a better understanding
of the main features of this new kind of circumscription, which should help a user to de-
termine whether cardinality-based circumscription is adequate for a given domain or not.
This study has also provided a few negative results about the translation from one circum-
scription to the other, in the finite case and in the infinite case. It has also provided a way
to express any finite circumscription as a combination of “rational consequence relations”.
Finally, we have clarified the equivalence between ordinary and cardinality-based circum-
scriptions, as regards the “expressive power”. For this purpose, we have elaborated on a
recent result about classical circumscription in the finite case, proving that it is actually an
equivalence and that it also holds for cardinality-based circumscription.
We have also proposed a small extension of the definition of cardinality-based
circumscription which seems to be better suited to some applications, and we have shown
that this version is always at least as expressive as ordinary circumscription.
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